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Abstract
We consider a two player simultaneous-move game where the two players each
select any permissible n-sided die for a fixed integer n. A player wins if the outcome
of his roll is greater than that of his opponent. Remarkably, for n > 3, there is
a unique Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. The unique Nash Equilibrium is
for each player to throw the Standard n-sided die, where each side has a different
number. Our proof of uniqueness is constructive. We introduce an algorithm with
which, for any nonstandard die, we may generate another die that beats it.
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1
1 Introduction
If Hercules and Lychas play at dice
Which is the better man, the greater throw
May turn by fortune from the weaker hand.
William Shakespeare,
The Merchant of Venice
Nontransitive dice are a fascinating topic in applied probability. They first came into
the limelight as a result of a paper by Martin Gardner [8] and are one of a larger class of
nontransitivity “paradoxes” (see [16], [2]), which also include the well-known Condorcet
Voting Paradox, as described in [7].
Recent papers published concerning nontransitive dice include [1], [4], and [15]. An-
other recent interpretation of the situation is [10], which instead reinterprets the scenario
through throws of unfair coins. Additionally, the issue of nontransitive dice is the subject
of a recent polymath project paper (see [12]), and indeed we borrow some terminology
from that paper.
One problem that may be considered is how nontransitive dice should be played in a
strategic interaction of two or more players. [14] was the first to explore this: it explores
the two player game where each player could choose one of four specific1 non-transitive
symmetric dice and finds the set of equilibria. It then extends the analysis to cover the
situation in which the players each choose two dice.
Here, we investigate a broader problem: we consider a two-player, one-shot, simul-
taneous move game in which each player selects a general n-sided die and rolls it. The
player with the highest face showing wins a reward, which we may normalize to 1. The
solution concept that we use for the game is that of a (pure strategy) Nash Equilibrium.2
We show that for n > 3 there is a single, unique3 Nash Equilibrium in which both players
1[14] formulates the problem using the four six-sided “Efron Dice”.
2Note that this game is a constant-sum game; therefore equivalent to a zero sum game, and for two
players the concept of a Nash Equilibrium is equivalent to that of a saddle point.
3There may be additional mixed strategy equilibria; however, in this analysis we focus exclusively
on pure strategy equilibria. Henceforth, by Nash Equilibrium or equilibrium, we mean only those in
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play the standard die. Moreover, our proof of uniqueness is constructive and contains
an algorithm that, for any non-standard die, generates a die that beats it. One notable
implication of this is that for any non-standard die, there is at least one die that is the
result of a one-step, the most elementary step of our algorithm, applied to the standard
die, that beats it. That is, for any die that is not the standard die, there is a die very
similar to the standard die that beats it.
The closest paper to this one, [6], considers the same problem, where for some fixed
integer n, two players each choose a die and roll against each other. It also shows that
the standard die ties any other die in expectation, and that every nonstandard die loses
to some other die. [5] explores dice games as well in a slightly more general setting, and
the existence and uniqueness of the the equilibrium in which both players each roll the
standard die follows from Propositions 6 and 8 in that paper.
Our paper differs from [6] and [5] in the following key ways. We provide different
proofs of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium in the game4, and we
are able to do so using exclusively elementary mathematics. Additionally, our proof is
constructive and we formulate a simple algorithm that allows us, for any non-standard
die, to generate a die that beats it. Moreover, our last result–that for any non standard
die, there is a die that beats it that is merely a one-step away from the standard die–is
also novel.
Finally, dice games can be placed in a more general context, as a member of the family
of Colonel Blotto games. First developed by E. Borel in 1921 (see [3]), a burgeoning
literature has resulted, due to the game’s general applications in economics, operations
research, political science, and other areas. Some recent papers include [13] and [9]. In
addition, recently, [11] explores a n player continuous version of this game played on the
interval [0, 1]. For two players, the unique equilibrium is the continuous analog of the
unique equilibrium here, the uniform distribution.
pure strategies.
4[6] do not explicitly show this, but it clearly follows from their Lemma 1 and Theorem 2.
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2 The Basic Game
Define a general n-sided die (henceforth just “die”) as an integer-valued random variable
Dn that takes values in the finite set
{
1, 2, ..., n
}
, where the distribution must satisfy
the following conditions:
1. For each possible value of Dn, di, the probability that it occurs, pdi , is a multiple
of 1/n.
2.
Ep(Dn) =
n∑
i=1
dipdi =
n+ 1
2
For a given n, denote the set of all n-sided dice by Dn.
Then, a standard n -sided die, Sn, is simply a die where each value occurs with equal
probability, 1/n. Naturally Sn ∈ Dn.
We can represent any n-sided die, Dn ∈ Dn, as a (discrete) uniformly distributed
random-variable that takes values in the multiset of size n, with elements in
{
1, 2, ..., n
}
and sum equal to n(n+1)
2
:
Dn =
{
[d1, d2, . . . , dn]
}
(1)
Example 1. The five 4-sided dice are S4 =
{
[1, 2, 3, 4]
}
, X4 =
{
[1, 1, 4, 4]
}
, Y4 ={
[2, 2, 2, 4]
}
,
{
[1, 3, 3, 3
}
,
{
[2, 2, 3, 3]
}
.
2.1 The Game
Consider two players, Amy (A) and Bob (B). They play the following one shot game. Fix
n, Amy and Bob each independently select any n-sided die, An, Bn ∈ Dn and then roll
them against each other. Their expected payoffs are the probability that the realization
of their roll is higher than the realization of their opponents roll5.
5If the realizations of the rolls are the same, the winner is decided by a (fair) coin flip.
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A Strategy for Amy, (and analogously for Bob), is simply a choice of die An ∈ Dn.
For any pair of strategies, (An, Bn), Amy’s expected payoff, UA(An, Bn), is
UA(An, Bn) = Pr(An > Bn) +
1
2
Pr(An = Bn)
Example 2. Suppose n = 4 and let Amy and Bob choose dice X4 and Y4 from Example
1, respectively. Then UA(X4, Y4) = 7/16 and UB(X4, Y4) = 9/16.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any n, the unique Nash Equilibrium of the two player game is where
both players play the standard die Sn. That is, the unique Nash Equilibrium is the
strategy pair (Sn, Sn).
We shall prove this theorem by proving two propositions: Proposition 1, that (Sn, Sn)
is a Nash Equilibrium; and Proposition 2, that (Sn, Sn) is the unique equilibrium (for
n ≥ 4).
Proposition 1. (Sn, Sn) is a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. First, we show that for all i ∈
{
A,B
}
and for all Dn ∈ Dn, Ui(Sn, Dn) =
Ui(Dn, Sn) =
1
2
.
Suppose player B chooses the standard die, Sn and player A chooses an arbitrary die
Dn =
{
[d1, d2, . . . , dn]
}
. If the realization of Dn is di; that is, dice Dn “lands” showing
face di, then with probability (di−1)/n, Dn beats the standard die, and with probability
1/n, Dn ties the standard die. Hence,
UA(Dn, Sn) =
n∑
i=1
(
1
n
)(
di − 1
n
+
1
n
·
1
2
)
=
(
1
n
)(
E[Dn
]
−
1
2
)
=
1
2
Since (Sn, Sn) yields to player B a payoff of 1/2, there is no profitable deviation.
For any die Dn ∈ Dn and any i and j such that i 6= j, di 6= 1 and dj 6= n, a One-step
from Dn is Φi,j(Dn) defined by
Φi,j(Dn) =
{
[d1, . . . , di−1, di − 1, di+1, . . . , dj−1, dj + 1, dj+1, . . . , dn]
}
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Evidently, Φi,j(Dn) satisfies the conditions in Equation 1 and so Φi,j(Dn) is a die.
We may make the following remark:
Remark 1. Any die can be reached in a sequence of one-steps from any other die. This
of course implies that any die can be reached in a sequence of one-steps from the standard
die, Sn.
For any two dice An, Bn ∈ Dn, we say An Beats Bn if the number of pairs (ai, bj)
with ai > bj exceeds the number of pairs with ai < bj .
It remains to show uniqueness, which we accomplish in the following lemma.
Proposition 2. The Nash Equilibrium, (Sn, Sn), is unique for n ≥ 4.
Proof. Clearly, for any strategy pair, player i has a profitable deviation if and only if
there is a die that beats her opponents die. Our proof is constructive and we show that
for any die Bn 6= Sn, we can construct a die, Gn, that beats it.
To that end, let Bn =
{
[b1, b2, . . . , bn]
}
, and (recall) Sn =
{
[1, 2, . . . , n]
}
. We intro-
duce γk, defined as
γk = |
{
bi|bi = k
}
|
for k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Note that each γ is a non-negative integer and that each satisfies
n∑
k=1
γk = n
n∑
k=1
kγk =
n(n+ 1)
2
Next, for k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 define ξk as
ξk = γk + γk+1
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To construct a die Gn that beats Bn, we need simply find a pair (ξi, ξj) with ξi > ξj
(and so clearly j 6= i) and i 6= j + 1. Then, simply add 1 to si and take 1 away from
sj+1 (hence the need for i 6= j + 1), and the resulting die will beat Bn.
Example 3. Suppose player A chooses die X4 from our previous examples, X4 ={
[1, 1, 4, 4]
}
. We have γ1 = 2, γ2 = γ3 = 0, and γ4 = 2, and so ξ1 = 2, ξ2 = 0,
ξ3 = 2, and ξ4 = 2. Evidently ξ1 > ξ2 and 1 = i 6= j + 1 = 2 + 1 = 3. Hence, we add 1
to s1 and subtract 1 from s3, yielding the die Y4 =
{
[2, 2, 2, 4]
}
, which beats X4. Indeed,
should player B choose Y4 she would achieve a payoff of 9/16 > 1/2.
Evidently, if ξa 6= ξb for some a, b, then there must be some i, j with ξi > ξj. Thus,
we establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If n ≥ 4, then for any non-standard n−sided die ∃ a pair a, b ∈
{
1, 2, ..., n
}
,
for which ξa 6= ξb.
Proof. Evidently ξa = ξb ∀a, b ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , n
}
if and only if
γ1 + γ2 = γ2 + γ3 = γ3 + γ4 = · · · = γn−1 + γn
which holds if and only if
γ1 = γ3 = · · · = γk ∀ odd integers k ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , n
}
γ2 = γ4 = · · · = γj ∀ even integers j ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , n
} (2)
We also have the following two relationships:
n∑
k odd
γk +
n∑
j even
γj = n (3)
and
n∑
k odd
kγk +
n∑
j even
jγj =
n(n + 1)
2
(4)
We can combine equations 2 and 3 to obtain
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n + 1
2
γ1 +
n− 1
2
γ2 = n (5)
for odd n. For even n, equations 2 and 3 yield
n
2
γ1 +
n
2
γ2 = n
or
γ1 + γ2 = 2 (6)
Furthermore, from equations 2 and 4, we have
n2
4
γ1 +
n(n + 2)
4
γ2 =
n(n + 1)
2
or
n
2
γ1 +
n + 2
2
γ2 = n+ 1 (7)
for even n. Now observe, we cannot have both γ1 ≥ 1 and γ2 ≥ 1 since if one were equal
to 1 and the other were greater than 1, this would violate 3; and if they were both equal
to 1, then Bn = Sn, a contradiction. Thus, either γ1 or γ2 must be equal to 0.
Suppose n is odd and that γ1 = 0. From equation 5 we have (n − 1)γ2 = 2n, which
does not have a solution in integers n, γ2 for n > 3. Next, suppose n is odd and that
γ2 = 0. From equation 5 we have (n + 1)γ1 = 2n, which does not have a solution in
integers n, γ1 for n > 1. Thus, we conclude that n cannot be odd.
Suppose n is even and that γ1 = 0. From equations 6 and 7 we must have γ2 = 2
and n + 2 = n + 1, which is obviously a contradiction. Finally, suppose n is even and
that γ2 = 0. From equations 6 and 7 we must have γ1 = 2 and n = n + 1, which is also
a contradiction. Thus we have proved Lemma 1.
To wrap up the proof of Proposition 2 we need to verify that we cannot have the
situation where the only pair ξi, ξj that satisfies ξi > ξj occurs when i = j + 1. To that
end, suppose ξi > ξj for i = j + 1. First, let j 6= 1. Then, if ξj−1 ≤ ξj, relabel j − 1 as
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j′, which yields ξi > ξj′ for i 6= j
′ + 1. On the other hand, if ξj−1 > ξj, relabel j − 1 as
i′, implying ξi′ > ξj for i
′ 6= j + 1. Next, let j = 1. If ξi+1 ≥ ξi, relabel i+ 1 as i
′, which
yields ξi′ > ξj for i
′ 6= j + 1. If, instead, ξi+1 < ξi, relabel i+ 1 as j
′, and thus we have
ξi > ξj′ for i 6= j
′ + 1.
We may also write the following Corollary, which we have proved along the way.
Corollary 1. Let n ≥ 4. Then, for any die Bn 6= Sn, ∃ a die Gn that is the image of a
one-step Φi,j on the standard die Sn that beats Bn.
Note that given some die Bn 6= Sn, the algorithm developed in our proof yields every
winning die (i.e. a die that beats Bn) that is a one-step away from Sn. Moreover, it is
easy to see how by “flipping” the algorithm we could also obtain the set of losing dice
that are a one-step away from Sn. Furthermore, the algorithm also enables us to find
the “best” (and “worst”) die/dice a one-step away from Sn to play versus Bn. The die
or dice with the greatest net gain from the one-step would have the highest likelihood
of beating Sn. In the same manner, the die or dice with the greatest (in absolute value)
net loss from the one-step would have the lowest likelihood of beating Sn.
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